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Outline
 Problem context of herbicide resistance (HR) 
 Common pool resource (CPR) complications
 Lessons from other CPR situations 
 Implications for developing private and public 
collective institutions
Problem Context
 Escalating herbicide resistance poses serious 
economic and environmental risks (NRC).
 Potential economic impacts include lower 
yields and increased costs.
 Potential environmental impacts include soil 
erosion, water quality, human health, etc.
 Public and private programs to control HR 
weeds have not slowed its spread overall.
Problem Context cont’d
 No silver bullet technology on horizon 
 Mobile herbicide resistance traits move 
across farm boundaries
 Solutions require collective action by 
heterogeneous growers in varying settings.
 This complexity requires interdisciplinary 
research by natural and social scientists 
working with growers.

Working Hypothesis
Sustainable HR management will require 
private and/or public collective institutions to 
address CPR issues via adaptive management 
strategies.
Common Pool Resource Complications
 Grower actions affect the welfare of other 
growers via weed gene movement.
 Hence, strategies to promote individual HR 
BMPs are insufficient to optimize the 
welfare of the farm community as a whole.
 Some form of private and/or public 
collective action is necessary. 
Design Principles for CPR Mgmt 
(Ostrom)
1. Clearly defined resource boundaries 
2. Rules adapted to local conditions
3. Broad participation by “appropriators” 
4. Monitoring accountable to the 
appropriators with sanctions
Design Principles for CPR Mgmt 
(Ostrom)
5. Scale of graduated sanctions 
6. Cheap and easy conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
7. Self-determination of the community 
recognized by higher authorities  
8. Larger issues may need “polycentric” 
governance with multiple layers.
Lessons from other CPR programs
 Invasive and noxious weed control
– State regulatory approach
– Formation of weed management areas  
recognizes need for community-wide effort
– WMAs can define problem boundaries as 
watersheds, land use areas, etc.
– Non-compliance procedures defined 
Lessons from other CPR programs
 Boll weevil eradication
– Caused by mobile insect that affected 
common pool of regional resources
– Three agencies in polycentric approach
• State DoAs – regulatory
• APHIS – technical advice
• CSREES – info dissemination & education 
– Required 2/3 vote on referendum to expand 
into new areas
Lessons from other CPR programs
 Irrigation (Ostrom, Stern and Dietz)
– Common pool of regional water resources
– Collective approaches were alternatives to 
privatization or government programs
– Spain, California and Nepal examples
– Recognition of need for adaptive 
management 
But CPR programs are complex….
 Agrawal (2003) – meta review
 Factors affecting formation do not have 
unequivocal effects, e.g., size of group
 Higher group heterogeneity not always 
a disadvantage
 Need to account for resource, 
social/political contexts and personal 
values  
Concluding observations
1. HR results from the interplay of 
biophysical, technological, economic and 
social factors. Leave any out at your peril!
2. Research on the roles of human and social 
capital in causing and arresting HR has 
been neglected.
3. Reliance on individual farmer approaches 
will fail with mobile HR traits. 
Concluding observations
4. Private and public collective approaches 
are necessary but will impose cost.
5. Ostrom’s design principles can help guide 
their development.
6. Success likely will come from participatory 
research using local  knowledge that 
minimizes transaction costs.      
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Socio-Economic Drivers of HR 
 Crop prices 
 Costs of alternative herbicide 
technologies
 Company HR BMP incentives 
 Farm household income
 Grower personal values about 
environmental stewardship 
Socio-Economic Drivers of HR 
 Farm program provisions, e.g., 
conservation compliance 
 Community social network (support and 
peer pressure)
 Grower education 
 Other?
HR Environmental Assessment
 Resistance management depends on 
gene mobility, BMP use and pesticide 
market structure (Miranowski & Carlson). 
 Environmental assessments of HR 
therefore must integrate human behavior. 
 Altering spatial and dynamic patterns of 
HR environmental impacts requires more 
interdisciplinary science.  
HR Environmental Assessment
 Voluntary ag conservation programs, e.g., 
education, without incentives have limited 
effect (Ervin).
 Knowledge of socioeconomic factors with 
large HR management leverage under 
CPR conditions is needed.
 The challenge is to design programs for 
local conditions that integrate learning 
and adaptive management.
Salient Questions
1. How does the interplay of biophysical,
economic and social factors affect 
growers’ herbicide management?
2. Can we identify different types of 
growers that are influenced by 
different sets of factors?
3. What variables influence the efficacy 
of private or public collective 
management institutions?
